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Abstract 
Public policies are the result of efforts made by governments to alter aspects of behaviour—both that of their own 
agents and of society at large—in order to carry out some end or purpose. They are comprised of arrangements of poli-
cy goals and policy means matched through some decision-making process. These policy-making efforts can be more, 
or less, systematic in attempting to match ends and means in a logical fashion or can result from much less systematic 
processes. “Policy design” implies a knowledge-based process in which the choice of means or mechanisms through 
which policy goals are given effect follows a logical process of inference from known or learned relationships between 
means and outcomes. This includes both design in which means are selected in accordance with experience and 
knowledge and that in which principles and relationships are incorrectly or only partially articulated or understood. Pol-
icy decisions can be careful and deliberate in attempting to best resolve a problem or can be highly contingent and 
driven by situational logics. Decisions stemming from bargaining or opportunism can also be distinguished from those 
which result from careful analysis and assessment. This article considers both modes and formulates a spectrum of pol-
icy formulation types between “design” and “non-design” which helps clarify the nature of each type and the likelihood 
of each unfolding. 
Keywords 
non-design; policy design; public policy 
Issue 
This article is part of a regular issue of Politics and Governance, edited by Professor Andrej J. Zwitter (University of Groning-
en, The Netherlands) and Professor Amelia Hadfield (Canterbury Christ Church University, UK). 
© 2014 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY). 
 
1. Introduction: Policy Design Studies Past and Future 
A roadmap for a new “policy design orientation” exists 
in studies undertaken in recent years into the formula-
tion of complex policy mixes in fields such as energy 
and environmental policy, among others (Howlett, 2014a; 
2014b; Howlett & Lejano, 2013; Howlett, Mukherjee, & 
Woo, 2014). This new design orientation focuses atten-
tion on the construction of policy packages operating in 
complex multi-policy and multi-level design contexts 
which are expected to address multiple goals and ob-
jectives (del Rio & Howlett, 2013). It seeks to better 
describe the nature of the bundles or portfolios of 
tools which can be used to address policy problems 
and to help understand the interactive effects which 
occur when multiple tools are used over time (Dore-
mus, 2003; Howlett, 2014b; Howlett, Mukherjee, & 
Woo, 2014; Jordan, Benson, Wurzel, & Zito, 2011; Jor-
dan, Benson, Zito, & Wurzel, 2012; Yi & Feiock, 2012). 
The research agenda of this new design orientation 
is focused on questions which an earlier literature on 
the subject largely neglected, such as the trade-offs ex-
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isting between different tools in complex policy mixes 
and how to deal with the synergies and conflicts which 
result from tool interactions; as well as the different 
means and patterns—such as layering—through which 
policy mixes evolve over time (Tan, Migone, Wellstead, 
& Evans, 2014; Thelen, 2004).  
This temporal orientation highlights the processes 
through which policies emerge and raises the issues of 
how to distinguish between design and other formula-
tion and decision-making processes and the frequency 
or likelihood of occurrence of each. Many formulation 
situations, for example, involve information and 
knowledge limits or imultiple actors whose relation-
ships may be more adversarial or competitive than is 
typically associated with a “design” process and out-
come (Gero, 1990; Schön, 1988). That is, not all policy-
making is logic or knowledge driven and it is debatable 
how closely policy-makers approximate the instrumen-
tal reasoning which is generally thought to characterize 
this field (Howlett et al., 2009). 
This paper addresses the differences between more, 
and less, analytical and instrumental policy formulation 
and decision processes and the likelihood of each occur-
ring. By engaging in a discussion of the intention to en-
gage in policy design—whether towards public interest or 
more politically driven opportunism—and of the capacity 
of governments to undertake such design efforts, the pa-
per develops a continuum of several formulation process-
es that can exist between ideal instrumental and prob-
lem-solution driven policy design and other more 
contingent and less intentional processes. 
2. What Is Policy Design? 
Within the policy sciences, “design” has been linked 
both to policy instruments and implementation (May, 
2003) and to the impact of policy ideas and advice on 
policy formulation (Linder & Peters, 1990a). It is usually 
thought to involve the deliberate and conscious attempt 
to define policy goals and connect them in an instru-
mental fashion to instruments or tools expected to real-
ize those objectives (Gilabert & Lawford-Smith, 2012; 
Majone, 1975; May, 2003). Policy design, in this sense, is 
a specific form of policy formulation based on the gath-
ering of knowledge about the effects of policy tool use 
on policy targets and the application of that knowledge 
to the development and implementation of policies 
aimed at the attainment of specifically desired public 
policy outcomes and ambitions (Bobrow, 2006; Bobrow 
& Dryzek, 1987; Montpetit, 2003; Weaver, 2009, 2010).  
In this sense, policy designs can be seen to contain 
both a substantive component—a set of alternative ar-
rangements thought potentially capable of resolving or 
addressing some aspect of a policy problem, one or 
more of which is ultimately put into practice—as well 
as a procedural component—a set of activities related 
to securing some level of agreement among those 
charged with formulating, deciding upon, and adminis-
tering that alternative vis-à-vis other alternatives (How-
lett, 2011). Design thus overlaps and straddles both 
policy formulation, decision-making and policy imple-
mentation and involves actors, ideas and interests ac-
tive at each of these stages of the policy process (How-
lett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009). However it also posits a 
very specific form of interaction among these ele-
ments, driven by knowledge and evidence of alterna-
tives’ merits and demerits in achieving policy goals ra-
ther than by other processes such as bargaining or 
electioneering among key policy actors. 
Conceptually, a policy design process begins with 
the analysis of the abilities of different kinds of policy 
tools to affect policy outputs and outcomes and the 
kinds of resources required to allow them to operate as 
intended (Hood, 1986; Salamon, 2002). This instrumen-
tal knowledge is contextual in the sense that it requires 
a special understanding of how the use of specific kinds of 
instruments affects target group behaviour and compli-
ance with government aims. It thus includes knowledge 
and consideration of many constraints on tool use origi-
nating in the limits of existing knowledge, prevailing gov-
ernance structures, and other arrangements and behav-
iours which may preclude consideration of certain options 
and promote others (Howlett, 2009a, 2011). It requires 
both government analytical and evidentiary capacity as 
well as the intention to exercise it. 
Such a means-ends understanding of policy-making 
permeates the policy design orientation but, of course, 
is only one possible orientation or set of practices 
which can be followed in policy formulation and result 
in policy-outputs (Colebatch, 1998; Tribe, 1972). In the 
design case, policy formulators are expected as much 
as possible to base their analyses on logic, knowledge 
and experience rather than, for example, purely politi-
cal calculations and forms of satisficing behaviour 
which also can serve to generate alternatives (Bendor, 
Kumar, & Siegel, 2009; Sidney, 2007).  
Policy design studies, of course, acknowledge that 
not all policy work is rational in this instrumental sense 
and often deals with alternative forms of policy formula-
tion by separating out two dimensions of the design ex-
perience: on the one hand the exploration of the proce-
dural aspects of design—the specific types of policy 
formulation activities which lead to design rather than 
some other form of policy generation—and on the other 
the substantive components—that is, the substance or 
content of a design in terms of the instruments and in-
strument settings of which it is composed. This is the 
policy-relevant articulation of the well-known distinction 
in design studies generally between “design-as-verb” 
(“policy formulation”) and “design-as-noun” (policy tool 
and instrument combinations).1  
                                                          
1 This is similar to the general orientation towards design 
found in other fields such as architecture, urban planning or 
 Politics and Governance, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 57-71 59 
The idea is that even when policy processes are less 
rational or information-driven and more political or in-
terest-driven, the design of a policy, conceptually at 
least, can be divorced from the processes involved in 
its enactment. Thus regardless of the nature of the ac-
tual alternative formulation process which exists in a 
specific context, it is still possible to imagine a more in-
strumental world and hence consider or promote de-
sign alternatives “in-themselves” as ideal-type artifacts. 
These can then be developed and studied in prepara-
tion for decision-making circumstances which might be 
propitious to their adoption either in “pure” form or 
with some minor adjustments or amendments. This is 
the bread-and-butter of policy analytical work under-
taken by think tanks, policy institutes and policy 
schools which generally criticize existing arrangements 
and propose more “rational” alternatives; that is, new 
or revised solutions to old or redefined problems felt 
more likely to achieve their goals in theory and practice 
or to do so more effectively. 
Again, however, this does not preclude, but rather 
is built upon the recognition and acceptance of the fact 
that in some policy decisions and formulation process-
es “design” considerations may be more or less absent 
and the quality of the logical or empirical relations be-
tween policy components as solutions to problems 
may be incorrect or ignored (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 
1979; Dryzek, 1983; Eijlander, 2005; Franchino & Hoy-
land, 2009; Kingdon, 1984; Sager & Rielle, 2013). This 
includes a variety of contexts in which formulators or 
decision-makers, for example, may engage in interest-
driven trade-offs or log-rolling between different val-
ues or resource uses or, more extremely, might engage 
in venal or corrupt behaviour in which personal gain 
from a decision may trump other evaluative criteria.  
These “non-design” situations are well known in po-
litical science but have not been well studied in the pol-
icy sciences and the extent to which such considera-
tions as political gain or blame avoidance calculations 
outweigh instrumental factors in policy formulation is a 
key question (Hood, 2010). As Junginger (2013) recent-
ly argued, at the present time we continue to know too 
little about many important aspects of design work, 
especially about the nature of the kinds of policy for-
mulation activities which bring about either a design or 
a non-design process. As she put it, we know very little 
about “the actual activities of designing that bring poli-
cies into being—of how people involved in the creation 
of policies go about identifying design problems and 
design criteria, about the methods they employ in their 
design process” (p. 3). This highlights the continued 
need to distinguish more carefully between design and 
non-design processes and to better understand the 
mechanics of policy formulation involved in developing 
                                                                                           
industrial design. See Hillier, Musgrove and O’Sullivan (1972), 
Hillier and Leaman (1974), and Gero (1990). 
policy alternatives (Linder & Peters, 1988; Wintges, 
2007). 
3. What Is Policy Design? 
In contrast to those who view policy-making as inten-
tional and instrumentally rational, many commenta-
tors, pundits and jaded or more cynical members of 
the public assume that all policy-making, as the output 
of a political system and decision-making process, is 
inherently interest-driven, ideological and hence irra-
tional in a design sense. However policy scholars have 
noted many instances in which processes of policy 
formulation and decision-making are governed less by 
considerations of self-interest, interest accommoda-
tion, bargaining or ideology than by concerns about cri-
teria such as the practical efficiency and effectiveness 
of policy alternatives. These latter efforts involve policy 
actors in the process of thinking more systematically 
and analytically about the merits and demerits of policy 
options and alternatives from a functional or instrumen-
tal perspective (Bobrow, 2006; Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987).  
Studies of policy design with this general instru-
mental orientation towards policy formulation began 
at the very origins of the policy sciences when many 
pivotal early works contained within them the idea of 
improving policy outcomes through more systematic 
application of knowledge to policy formulation activi-
ties (Lasswell & Lerner, 1951; May, 2003; Wildavsky, 
1979).2 In his foundational work on the policy sciences, 
for example, Harold Lasswell argued for the separation 
of the processes of policy formulation from decision-
making and implementation, highlighting the centrality 
and significance of policy instruments and instrument 
choices made in the formulation process for policy out-
comes and arguing for the need to bring interdiscipli-
nary knowledge to bear on the development of the ap-
propriate means to resolve public problems and issues 
(Lasswell, 1954). 
For the “old” policy design studies which emerged 
from this foundational work, the historical and institu-
tional context of policy-making was seen to bear signif-
icant weight in policy formulation, and this was often 
argued to be determinant of both the content and ac-
tivities of designs and designing (Clemens & Cook, 
1999). In this view, as policy contexts and conditions 
changed and evolved, so too did the set of policy 
means or alternatives which were deemed acceptable 
                                                          
2 Policy design studies have been undertaken since at least 
the 1950s (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953; Kirschen et al., 1964; Tin-
bergen, 1952). Most of the early studies focused on policy 
tools and had a strong focus on policy implementation issues 
and processes; paying much less attention to policy devel-
opment or formulation issues which are the hallmark of cur-
rent studies with a design orientation (Hood, 1986; Hood & 
Margetts, 2007). 
 Politics and Governance, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 57-71 60 
or feasible by an evolving set of policy actors involved 
in policy-making, themselves informed by shifting ideas 
and calculations of the appropriateness of a particular 
design and its consequences (Goldmann, 2005; Majone, 
1975, 1976; March & Olsen, 2004; Howlett, 2011). While 
this context might contain irrational elements such as 
ideological or partisan pre-dispositions towards certain 
kinds of instruments—such as a general pro-market 
orientation among the public or elites—the choice of 
tool within this context remained an intentional, ra-
tional act. 
This highly contextual orientation in early policy 
studies (Torgerson, 1985, 1990) led some policy schol-
ars in the 1970s to argue policy decisions were by na-
ture the result of processes so highly contingent and 
fraught with uncertainty that decision-making would 
invariably be informed more by the opportunistic be-
haviour of decision-makers within fluid policy-making 
contexts than by careful deliberation and “design” think-
ing about the logical or functional merits and demerits of 
specific alternative arrangements of policy goals and 
means (Cohen et al., 1979; Dryzek, 1983; Kingdon, 1984; 
Lindblom, 1959).3 This led some to express serious 
doubts that policy could truly be “designed” in the way 
that proponents of a more instrumental policy design 
orientation advocated (deLeon, 1988; Dryzek & Ripley, 
1988).  
Many other scholars, however, questioned the ex-
tent of this emphasis on contextuality and contingency 
(Dror, 1964). The academic enquiry of policy design—
that is, self-consciously dealing with both policy pro-
cesses and substance under a knowledge-driven, in-
strumental rubric—emerged and flourished through-
out the 1970s and 1980s in trying to clarify what a 
design process involved and when it was likely to occur 
(see for example, Salamon 1981, 1989, 2002). In a se-
ries of path-breaking articles in the 1980s and early 
1990s authors such as Linder and Peters (1984, 1988, 
1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1990d, 1991) sought to re-orient 
policy studies in a design direction by arguing that the 
process of policy designing as a type of formulation ac-
tivity was conceptually distinct from a policy design it-
self, in the same way that an analytical distinction can 
be made between the development of an abstract con-
cept or plan in architecture and the manifestation of 
that conception through engineering and construction 
practices followed on the ground (Schön, 1988, 1992). 
Incorporating this distinction between design-as-
formulation-process and design-as-policy-content, de-
sign studies in the 1980s shifted back from the study of 
“designing” to the study of “designs” themselves, with 
a specific focus on better understanding how individual 
implementation-related policy tools and instruments 
such as taxes and subsidies or regulation and public 
                                                          
3 Of course this is a view some continue to hold. See for ex-
ample Eijlander (2005), Franchino and Hoyland (2009).  
ownership operated in theory and practice (Mayntz, 
1979; Sterner, 2003; Woodside, 1986).4  
By the early 1980s, this tools literature had merged 
with the policy design orientation and emerged as a 
body of policy design literature in its own right. Stu-
dents of policy design consequently embarked upon 
theory building, developing more and better typologies 
of policy instruments that sought to aid the conceptu-
alization of these instruments and their similarities and 
differences, and attempting to provide a greater un-
derstanding of the motivations and reasons underlying 
their use (Bressers & Honigh, 1986; Bressers & Klok, 
1988; Hood, 1986; Salamon, 1981; Trebilcock & Hartle, 
1982; Tupper & Doern, 1981). Other scholarly work 
during this period continued to further elucidate the 
nature and use of specific policy tools, especially tools 
such as “command-and-control” regulations and finan-
cial inducements such as tax incentives but also many 
others (Hood, 1986; Howlett, 1991; Landry, Varone, & 
Goggin, 1998; Tupper & Doern, 1981; Vedung, Be-
melmans-Videc, & Rist, 1997).  
This tools orientation sparked interest in a range of 
related subjects, such as the study of target group be-
haviour, of implementation failures and their role in 
policy success, and of the linkages connecting the two; 
with policy scholars turning their attention to the de-
scription and classification of alternative implementa-
tion instruments and the factors which conditioned 
their effective use and deployment (Goggin, Bowman, 
Lester, & OʼToole, 1990; Mayntz, 1979; O’Toole, 2000; 
Schneider & Ingram, 1990a, 1990b, 1994). These works 
provided a deeper understanding of the social and be-
havioural factors underpinning the use of specific kinds 
of policy designs in practice.5 In general it was believed 
                                                          
4 Students of public policy making were joined in this effort 
by scholars of economics and law who studied the evaluation 
of policy outputs in terms of their impacts on outcomes as 
well as the role of law and legislation in effecting policy tool 
choices and designs (Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987; Keyes, 1996; 
Stokey & Zeckhauser, 1978). And studies in management and 
administration at the time also sought to explore the linkages 
between politics, administration and implementation in the 
effort to better understand policy tool choices and patterns 
of use (Trebilcock & Hartle, 1982). Researchers also looked at 
how policy instrument choices tended to shift over time 
(Lowi, 1966, 1972, 1985), examples of which during this peri-
od included the rise of privatization and deregulation (How-
lett & Ramesh, 1993) and the first wave of governance think-
ing advocating the use of network management or non-
governmental tools (Peters & Pierre, 1998). 
5 Subsequent contributions would further advance the study 
of the behavioural aspects of the design process and raised 
the issue of the difference between design and non-design to 
the fore (Hood, 2007; Ingram & Schneider, 1990a; Mondou & 
Montpetit, 2010; Schneider & Ingram, 1997; Timmermans, 
Rothmayr, Serduelt, &Varone, 1998). At this time, for exam-
ple, Bardach (1980) and Salamon (1981) went so far as to ar-
gue that the definition of policy in terms of “issues” or “prob-
 Politics and Governance, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 57-71 61 
a greater understanding of implementation instru-
ments and the factors underlying instrument choice 
would benefit policy design both as a practice and a 
theoretical body of knowledge, contributing to more 
positive policy outcomes (Linder & Peters, 1984; 
Mayntz, 1979; Woodside, 1986). Studies on pollution 
prevention and professional regulation conducted at 
the time, for example, benefited from advances in the 
systematic study of policy instruments which influ-
enced the design and creation of new alternative in-
struments in these and other fields (Hippes, 1988; Tre-
bilcock & Prichard, 1983).  
Most of this work focused on implementation and 
tool design-as-a-noun, however, and ignored or failed 
to examine in detail the issues involved in policy-
design-as-formulation-process.6 Understanding the dif-
ference between “non-design” and design processes 
thus remains very much a part of the outstanding re-
search agenda in contemporary policy design studies. 
As shall be argued below, however, some progress in 
this area can be made by illustrating these different 
formulation processes as a continuum ranging from in-
tentional ones informed by an instrumental logic of 
best matching public policy goals and means (“de-
sign”), to those that are more contingent and more 
susceptible to purely interest-driven or political moti-
vations and logics (“non-design”).  
3.1. Modeling Non-Design: Revisiting the  
Pre-Conditions of Policy Design 
The design end of the spectrum has already been dis-
cussed. With respect to non-design, it bears repeating 
that the modern policy studies movement did begin 
with the recognition that public policy-making results 
from the interactions of policy-makers in the exercise 
                                                                                           
lems” originally made by scholars at the outset of the policy 
studies movement (Mintrom, 2007) was misguided and that 
policy should instead have been defined from the start in 
terms of the “instruments” used in policy-making. They advo-
cated shifting the focus of policy studies squarely towards the 
study of the design and operation of such tools, later defined 
to include both traditional “substantive” tools such as regula-
tion and public ownership and more “procedural” ones such 
as the use of advisory commissions and public participation 
exercises (Howlett, 2000).  
6 Of course, not all work on policy instruments has restricted 
itself to implementation issues. Work on the exploration of 
“instrumentation” for example, has considered larger issues 
about feedback processes from instrument choices to the 
politics of policy formation, as has some work on instruments 
and network governance (see de Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, 
1997; Lascoumes & Le Gales, 2007). However these can still 
be distinguished from the new design studies, given the lat-
ter’s almost exclusive emphasis on formulation and its result-
ing concern for understanding the inherent nuances involved 
in developing mechanisms for meeting policy goals, couched 
within contextual realities, which the former studies still lack.  
of power, legitimate or otherwise (Arts & van 
Tatenhove, 2004; Lasswell, 1958; Stone, 1988). Alt-
hough some of these efforts were noted to be arbitrary 
or capricious, most were viewed as representing the 
concerted efforts of governments to intentionally act in 
an instrumental way; that is, to attempt to achieve a 
particular policy goal or end through the use of a rela-
tively well known set of policy means developed over 
many years of state-building experience (Lasswell & 
Lerner, 1951). As discussed above, it was acknowl-
edged the goals pursued were wide-ranging and often 
posed no small amount of difficulty and complexity in 
both their definition and diagnosis, with the implica-
tion that the formulation of solutions likely to succeed 
in addressing them necessitated the systematic consid-
eration of the impact and feasibility of the use of spe-
cific kinds of policy means or instruments as well as a 
clear understanding of the contexts of their use (Par-
sons, 1995, 2001).  
This work thus depicted instrumental policy-making 
as a specific kind of policy activity which occurred in 
specific circumstances in which knowledge of the gen-
eral impact of specific policy tools was combined with 
the practical capacity of governments to identify and 
implement suitable technical means in the effort to 
achieve a specific policy aim. This activity was expected 
to occur ex ante and independently of other considera-
tions such as political or personal gain which might also 
affect decision-making and implementation processes 
but which should be removed from the deliberations of 
formulation.  
Significantly for considerations of design and non-
design processes, as noted above, this “design” activity 
was recognized as being inherently context bound, that 
is, requiring a situation where there was support for 
knowledge-based policy analysis on the part of policy-
makers and where the demand for such analysis was 
met by a ready supply (Howlett et al., 2014). Favorable 
design circumstances hence required not only the 
presence of high quality information on the range and 
impacts of policy alternatives but also the presence of 
a high level of technical capacity and expertise on the 
part of policy analysts if knowledge was to be mobi-
lized effectively so that policy instruments were effec-
tively and efficiently matched to policy goals and tar-
gets (Dunlop, 2009; Howlett, 2009a, 2010; Howlett & 
Rayner, 2014; Radaelli & Dunlop, 2013). Secondly, it was 
also recognized that not only “spatial” but also “tem-
poral” aspects of policy formulation contexts such as 
policy legacies or prior commitments on the part of poli-
cy-makers limited consideration of alternatives. Where 
there was a relatively high policy “lock-in” on existing 
tool arrangements, this could preclude consideration or 
adoption of potentially superior alternatives (Howlett & 
Rayner, 2013).  
When propitious conditions were present, howev-
er, purposive design activity resulting in good alterna-
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tive generation and assessment was thought to be pos-
sible, much as is expected in the current era with re-
cent efforts at improving knowledge mobilization in 
policy-making in the form of an emphasis upon en-
hanced “evidence-based policy-making” (Bhatta, 2002; 
Locke, 2009; Nutley, Walter, & Davies, 2007). When 
conditions are not ripe, however, either poor designs 
would ensue from incomplete knowledge and infor-
mation even with the best government intent, or less 
technical and more overtly political forms of policy-
making would be more likely to ensue (Davies, 2004; 
Howlett, 2009b; Moseley & Tierney, 2004). The fervent 
wish of proponents of design orientation is generally to 
reduce instances of poor and non-design to as few as 
possible by promoting the kinds of orientations and 
dedication of resources required for better design pro-
cesses to occur. This, is expected to result in policies 
more likely to solve pressing problems, correct social ills 
and better serve the public good through the improved 
mobilization of knowledge in the service of policy (Azue-
la & Barroso, 2012; Bobrow, 2006; Wildavsky, 1979). 
Table 1 presents a schematic illustrating how these 
two different aspects of policy-making—a design inten-
tion and the capacity to carry it out—create different 
policy formulation spaces which enable very different 
policy design processes. This sets out a set of formula-
tion processes lying between the intention and ability 
to undertake purposive, instrumental policy design and 
the intention to meet more political goals coupled with 
the presence of significant policy resource constraints 
or tool lock-in affects. 
As this table shows, both policy and political formu-
lation processes can be capable or poor depending on 
the context of policy-making and the intention of gov-
ernment in enacting policy. This suggests that a spec-
trum of design and non-design formulation processes 
exists between capable policy processes informed by 
instrumental motivations and “poor” political ones 
driven by other logics but also unlikely to attain them. 
In between the poles lie other spaces and formulation 
types such as poor design and capable non-design, al-
ternatives often mooted but rarely examined in the 
policy sciences. 
4. Developing a Spectrum of Design and Non-Design 
Activities: The Significance of Layering and 
Temporality 
While the distinction between policy-driven and political-
ly-driven processes is clear, in order to be more precise 
about variations within these general types and their fre-
quency of occurrence, it is necessary to examine in more 
detail the nature of the constraints on government inten-
tions which can result in poor outcomes. 
As set out above, one key factor is the extent to 
which an existing policy regime is settled in place. That 
is, very few design processes begin de novo. Examples 
of new policy “packages” in many areas, from welfare 
policy to natural resource ones exist only historically, 
reflecting times before which there was no previous 
history of a policy response to a perceived policy prob-
lem. For example, the United States (US) Clean Air Act 
(CAA) (first enacted in 1970) was the first major federal 
air pollution legislation in the US that established the 
very first national benchmark for ambient sulfur diox-
ide (SO2) (Libecap, 2005; Schmalensee, Joskow, Eller-
man, Montero, & Bailey, 1998).  
Such examples of new policy designs are under-
standably few. Most policy initiatives rather deal with 
already created policies that are limited by historical 
legacies, and can be hampered due to internal incon-
sistencies which reforms and revisions (re-designs) at-
tempt to address and correct. In this case legacies from 
earlier rounds of decision-making affect the introduc-
tion of new elements which may conflict with pre-
existing policy components. Although other policy in-
strument groupings could theoretically be more suc-
cessful in creating an internally supportive combination 
(Grabosky, 1994; Gunningham, Grabosky, & Sinclair, 
1998; Hou & Brewer, 2010; Howlett, 2004; Howlett & 
Rayner, 2007; del Rio, 2010; Barnett & Shore, 2009; Blonz, 
Vajjhala, & Safirova, 2008; Buckman & Diesendorf, 2010; 
Roch, Pitts, & Navarro, 2010) it may be very difficult to 
accomplish or even propose such changes, and designs 
instead often focus on reform rather than replacement 
of an existing arrangement. 
Table 1. Types of policy formulation spaces: Situating design and non-design processes. 
 Level of Government Knowledge and Other Resources 
  High Low 
Government 
Formulation 
Intention  
More Instrumental  Capable Policy Design Space 
Relatively unconstrained formulation via 
design is possible  
Poor Policy Design Space 
Only partially informed or restricted design 
is possible 
Less Instrumental Capable Political Non-Design Space 
Relatively unconstrained non-design 
processes are possible 
Poor Political Non-Design Space 
Only poorly informed non-design is possible 
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Policy development strongly marked by layering in 
this way is typically one where new elements are add-
ed to the policy mix without the removal of older ones 
and existing elements are stretched to try to fit new 
goals and changing circumstances (van der Heijden, 
2011).7 That is, policy arrangements are often the re-
sult of transformation pathways that can easily lead to 
internal contradictions emerging between tools and 
goals within policy mixes (Hacker, 2004), and mixes of 
policy elements can emerge over long stretches of time 
as a result of successive policy decisions which are not 
necessarily congruent. An example of such incongru-
ence within a policy mix can be found in the CAA, the 
development of which has been heavily analyzed since 
the 1970s (Ackerman, 1981; Greenstone, 2001; among 
others). The 1977 amendments to the Act created a 
“new source bias” as all new coal-powered plants were 
required to install scrubbers even if they used low-
sulfur coal. This rule undermined the comparative ad-
vantage of “cleaner” coal as the amendments raised 
the cost of shifting to new, less polluting plants and ex-
tended the economic lives of older, more polluting 
plants that did not have to shoulder the added cost of 
scrubbers (Libecap, 2005).  
This is only one small example of a general situation 
where the initial logic of each decision matching policy 
tool and target may have been clear, but through mul-
tiple layering processes they can gradually transform 
over time into incongruent mixes (Bode, 2006; Hacker, 
2004; Howlett & Rayner, 1995; Orren & Skowronek, 
1998; Rayner, Howlett, Wilson, Cashore, & Hoberg, 
2001; Torenvlied & Akkerman, 2004; van der Heijden, 
2011). This can create policy portfolios or mixes that 
contain various incompatibilities, tending to frustrate 
the achievement of policy goals. 
The contextual “lock in” that leads to layering im-
pacts the formulation process by restricting a govern-
ment’s ability to evaluate alternatives and plan or design 
in a purely optimal instrumental manner (Howlett, 
2009a; Oliphant & Howlett, 2010; Williams, 2012). Lay-
ering typically results in processes of (re)design which al-
ters only some aspects of a pre-existing arrangement 
and can thus be distinguished from processes of new 
policy packaging or complete replacement. Distinguish-
ing between different types of layering allows us to fur-
ther separate and identify different kinds of design and 
non-design processes from each other.  
                                                          
7 Layering, of course is a concept developed in the neo-
institutional sociological literature by some of its leading fig-
ures, namely Beland (2007), Beland and Hacker (2004), Hacker 
(2004), Stead and Meijers (2004) and Thelen (2004) to explain 
the pattern through which social and political institutions have 
evolved over long-periods of time. As applied to policy-making, 
“layering” connotes a process in which new elements are simp-
ly added to an existing regime often without abandoning pre-
vious ones so that polices accrete in a palimpsest-like fashion 
(Carter, 2012).  
While earlier work on design processes tended to 
suggest that design would always occur in spaces 
where policy packages could be designed “en bloc”, it is 
now recognized that most design circumstances in-
volve building on the foundations created in another 
era, working within already sub-optimal design spaces 
(Howlett & Rayner, 2013). Optimizing the choice of in-
struments when a pre-existing mix exists thus requires 
an additional level of knowledge of instrument-goal in-
teractions and usually leads to design through “patch-
ing” rather than “packaging” (Howlett & Rayner, 2013). 
That is, in situations with significant policy legacies, de-
signers often attempt to “patch” or restructure existing 
policy elements rather than propose completely new 
alternative arrangements even if the situation might 
require the latter for the sake of optimally enhancing 
coherence and consistency in the reformed policy mix 
(Eliadis, Hill, & Howlett, 2005; Howlett & Rayner, 2013; 
Gunningham & Sinclair, 1999a, 1999b; Thelen, 2004; 
Thelen et al., 2003). Hence even where the intention to 
systematically design may be high it may only be partial 
in the sense that only patching and not replacement is 
on the table.  
A key first distinction among design formulation 
processes thus concerns whether they involve “packag-
ing” a new policy mix or “patching” an old one. Policy 
design scholars are very interested in the processes 
through which policy formulators, like software de-
signers, can issue such “patches” to correct flaws in ex-
isting mixes or allow them to adapt to changing cir-
cumstances (Howlett, 2013; Howlett & Rayner, 2013; 
Rayner, 2013).8 Such patching or “smart layering” has 
often been thought to be inherently sub-optimal but 
patching in itself should be seen not as “non-design”, 
but rather as constrained (re)design as a new layer is 
formulated in an effort to overcome anomalies or 
problems existing with earlier arrangements (Howlett 
& Rayner, 2013).  
Patching can be done well if governments possess 
the capacity to do so but can also be done poorly if 
they do not. An example of poor patching is policy 
“stretching” (Feindt & Flynn, 2009). This is where, op-
erating over periods of decades or more, elements of a 
mix are simply extended to cover areas they were not 
intended to at the outset. “Stretching” is especially 
problematic as small changes in the mixture of policy 
elements over such a time period can create a situation 
where the elements can fail to be mutually supportive, 
incorporating contradictory goals or instruments 
                                                          
8 And they are also interested in related subjects such as how 
policy experiments can help reveal the possibilities of re-
design (Hoffman, 2011) or how building temporal properties 
into tool mixes—“adaptive policy-making” (Swanson et al., 
2010)—can make designs more flexible or resistant to shift-
ing conditions (Haasnoot, Kwakkel, Walker, & ter Maat, 2013; 
Walker, Marchau, & Swanson, 2010). 
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whose combination create perverse incentives that 
frustrate initial policy goals. These problems when  
identified set the stage for further rounds of tinkering 
and layering that may make them even worse (Feindt 
& Flynn, 2009).  
Both stretching and poor patching efforts hence 
can create a particular form of “tense layering” (Kay, 
2007) which occurs when repeated bouts of layering 
lead to incoherence amongst goals and inconsistency 
with respect to the instruments and settings used in a 
policy area. Inconsistencies arise where the means 
work at cross-purposes, “providing simultaneous in-
centives and disincentives towards the attainment of 
stated goals” (Kern & Howlett, 2009, p. 6). And incon-
gruence occurs when an otherwise consistent mix of 
instruments fails to support the goals. Stretching is 
problematic as a design process since the addition of 
new goals or objectives increases the risk of incoher-
ence, while the introduction of policy instruments 
through poor patching, for example, when a market 
orientation is introduced into an instrument set that 
has been based on a regulatory approach (Howlett & 
Rayner, 2007) is also unlikely to work well.  
Using the case of British food policy, Feindt and 
Flynn (2009), for example, describe a situation of insti-
tutional stretching where “concerns about food supply 
and high productivity have been overlaid with policies 
addressing food safety, the environment, quality foods, 
obesity and climate change” (p. 386). As a result, they 
argue, “the resulting tensions…create opportunities for 
more new ideas and actors to move in, fuelled by a 
plurality of social constructions of food. Also, each new 
layer re-adjusts the power balance and necessitates re-
interpretations of older policies” (p. 386). 
Layering and patching thus have two sides. On the 
one hand negative stretching or destructive layering 
exacerbates tensions between regime elements and 
more politicized or less instrumental forms of policy-
making and outcomes. However layering can also have 
a positive side and help ameliorate or reduce tensions 
through “smart” patching. Stretching and poor patch-
ing are thus design practices which exist at the break-
point between design and non-design activities of gov-
ernment. Both these processes fall between the “pure” 
design and “pure” non-design ends of the spectrum of 
design processes suggested in Table 1.  
As Figure 1 shows, these forms of policy-oriented 
formulation processes move from highly intentional 
and instrumental replacement efforts to those which 
are more partial and less intentional such as “smart” 
patching and ultimately to those which involve poor 
design such as “stretching” and poor or tense layering. 
In cases such as these layering introduces progressively 
more severe inconsistencies and incongruences and 
tensions between layers and policy-making and formu-
lation may begin to take on an increasingly political 
complexion as the original logic and causality of a mix 
recedes into dim memory. 
Non-design types also vary in the same way as par-
tisan and ideological, religious or other criteria cloud, 
crowd out or replace instrumental design intentionali-
ty. Non-design mechanisms, as highlighted above, in-
clude activities such as alternative generation by bar-
gaining or log-rolling, through corruption or co-
optation efforts or through other faith-based or purely 
electoral calculations which are not instrumental in the 
same sense as are design efforts. In such contexts the 
ability of policy goals to be met or the ability of means 
to achieve them are of secondary concern to other 
concerns such as ideological purity or the need to re-
tain or augment legislative or electoral support or oth-
er similar kinds of coalition behaviour.  
These too, however, can also be done well or poor-
ly and are affected by contextual barriers but are not 
“design” activities in the intentional instrumental pub-
lic problem-solving sense set out above. That is, max-
imizing the return from a bargain or the returns from 
corruption, for example, also depends on the context, 
situation and expertise of actors but does not involve 
the same kinds of appraisal activities and competences 
or intentions on the part of governments as does policy 
design work. 
Non-design processes have been studied extensive-
ly in the political science literature but less systemati-
cally in the policy sciences (Frye, Reuter, & Szakonyi, 
2012; Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, & Nichter, 2014; Goodin, 
1980; Saward, 1992) despite their prevalence and im-
portance in many areas. While it is not necessary to in-
clude them in a spectrum of design work, they can be 
appended to a spectrum of formulation types by mov-
ing from those types of non-design work which are 
compatible with at least some aspects of instrumental 
design activities—such as bargaining among affected 
interests over elements of otherwise carefully designed 
policy alternatives—to those—such as pure electoral 
opportunism or corruption—where party, leader or in-
dividual self-interest replace policy instrumentalism al-
together (see Figure 2). 
 
 Figure 1. A spectrum of design processes. 
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Figure 2. A spectrum of design and non-design processes. 
 
5. Conclusion: Distinguishing Design from  
Non-Design-Based Formulation 
Transforming policy ambitions into practice is a com-
plex process and intentionally creating the best possi-
ble arrangement of policy elements is not always the 
first item on a government’s mind, nor necessarily 
within its reach. Many noble efforts of policy formula-
tors have failed due to poor design capacity or the ina-
bility or lack of desire on the part of decision-makers to 
alter elements of existing policies or create new ones in 
a logical, instrumental, fashion (Cohn, 2004; Howlett, 
2012). These experiences have led to a greater aware-
ness of the various obstacles that can present them-
selves to policy design efforts and have gradually fueled 
a desire for better understanding the unique character-
istics of policy formulation processes and the spaces and 
contexts in which design efforts are embedded.  
As the discussion here has shown, both design and 
non-design processes vary along several important di-
mensions. For design situations—that is those charac-
terized by a government desire to systematically match 
ends and means in the attainment of public policy 
goals, the processes vary according to the nature of the 
resources available for design purposes and the con-
straints imposed by policy legacies. The former often 
determine the quality of the design effort and impact 
the design itself while the latter generate contexts in 
which processes such as patching and stretching un-
fold. In a more non-design world where the intention to 
instrumentally design is lacking, constraints on out-
comes also exist as do different processes which vary in 
their distance from the design ideal of public value and 
service and improving the public good through better in-
formation and knowledge utilization and improved 
management efforts (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2012; Rot-
berg, 2014). 
Students of policy design must be aware of these 
different formulation contexts, processes and out-
comes and be able to properly and accurately assess 
the situations governments are in or want to be in 
while developing policy options and when making rec-
ommendations and providing advice to governments. 
More systematic study of the formulation contexts and 
processes set out above can help move this area of pol-
icy design studies forward. 
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